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Restorative Justice and Victims of Crime:                                   
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Meredith Rossner 
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Walklate (Ed), Routlege 2017.  
Introduction 
 
In 2013 the UK Ministry of Justice announced that £29 Million will be made 
available to local Police and Crime Commissioners to deliver restorative justice.1  A 
notable aspect of this announcement was that it was positioned as part of a 
government initiative to help victims of crime.  Indeed, the money to fund this 
windfall is to be raised through the Victims Surcharge: money from offenders would 
be used to finance restorative justice for victims.  2013 also saw a new Code of 
Practice for Victims, stating that all victims of young offenders have a right to 
restorative justice, and victims of adult offenders have the right to learn about 
restorative justice and assess its appropriateness.  Finally, the Crime and Courts Act 
2013 gave statutory footing for restorative justice, allowing judges to defer sentence 
until restorative justice takes place, if both victim and offender want it.  The most 
recent Restorative Justice Action Plan was published by the Ministry of Justice in 
2014, covering the period to 2018.  In it, they explain their vision for ‘good quality, 
victim-focused restorative justice to be available at all stages of the criminal justice 
system in England and Wales’ (p. 2).  This includes ensuring all victims have equal 
access to restorative justice at all stages of the criminal justice system, the public has 
an awareness and understanding of restorative justice, and that good quality 
restorative justice is consistently delivered.   
 
This flurry of activity suggests that restorative justice is indeed moving to the 
mainstream of criminal justice (London 2011) and that current policy directions 
situate restorative justice as a ‘victim-centred’ movement (Hoyle 2012).  This has not 
always been the case: in 2001 the Home Office funded a large-scale research project 
testing whether restorative justice could reduce recidivism (Sherman et al. 2015), and 
most of the early work on restorative justice has been ‘profoundly ambivalent towards 
victims’ (Dignan 2007: 105). 
 
Given this trend towards promoting what might be victim-friendly elements of 
restorative justice, it is worth revisiting some of the theoretical and empirical 
foundations that underpin restorative justice and some hurdles and challenges that 
need to be overcome to maximize benefits for victims.  This chapter will attempt to 
do this in four parts.  First I examine the debate around defining restorative justice. I 
will then discuss some of the main theoretical traditions that might explain what 
restorative justice can offer victims. Next, I review some of the empirical work on 
how victims around the world have experienced restorative justice. Finally, I discuss 
some of the challenges for victims and restorative justice, particularly in the current 
policy climate in England and Wales.  
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What do victims want? 
 
Before defining restorative justice and the role that victims might play, it is useful to 
canvass some of the research on what victims want out of a justice process.  Bottoms 
and Roberts (2010) have identified three different types of needs and interests that a 
victim of crime may have.  The first is service needs, which can include information 
about the status and outcomes of their case, compensation, respectful treatment, and 
help with testifying (if they are invited to court as a witness).  The second set of needs 
is expressive, which can include strategies to ‘give a voice’ to victims where they can 
express their experience, harm, and desires.  The final set of needs relate to 
participation or decision-making, where victims can influence criminal justice 
decision-making in bail, sentencing, and parole.  
 
Empirical research has suggested that victims do tend to have service needs, 
expressive needs, and participation needs. Strang (2002) has suggested the victims 
want: (1) a less formal process where their views are listened to, (2) more information 
about their case, (3) to be able to participate in their case, (4) to be treated fairly and 
with respect, (5) material restoration, and (6) emotional restoration and apology. 
Some victims want to participate in the process but others also want to be relieved of 
‘the burden of decisions relating to the offender’ (Victim Support, 1995).  Finding 
like this are consistent across much of the victimological literature (see Shapland et 
al. 1985, Shapland 1986, Walklate 2013).  
 
What seems clear is that expressive and service needs are what victims most want 
met:  being listed to, being respected, achieving restoration.  In a study of victims who 
have been invited to give input in a criminal case, Van Dijk (2001) notes: 
  
Victims exercising their right to speak up in court about their feelings and 
opinions do not typically demand harsh punishment.  Most victims do not 
apparently use their new rights as a retributive tool.  They want to be 
recognized as concerned parties and to be notified of judicial decisions (p 
130).   
 
The question, then, is whether restorative justice can meet these needs. In the sections 
that follow I will provide a definition of restorative justice, with a focus on the 
procedural elements, underlying values, and desired outcomes.  
Defining Restorative Justice 
 
One challenge of restorative justice is the assortment of different definitions available 
(Doolin 2007; Johnstone and Van Ness 2007).  It can describe various innovations in 
criminal justice and incorporates a wide array of diverse aspirations.  This is not 
limited to criminal justice- restorative justice programmes can be found in schools, 
workplaces, and transitional justice settings. This chapter, however, on domestic 
criminal justice.  
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Those looking for a straightforward definition of restorative justice quickly find 
themselves confronted with a range of different approaches, perspectives, and 
emphases. Dignan (2005) has suggested that definitions of restorative justice vary 
depending on the emphasis placed on the process, values, or outcomes.  I will briefly 
consider each of these in turn. 
 
One source of confusion is that restorative justice has been defined at times as a set of 
values and other times as a practice (Braithwaite 2002; Johnstone 2013; Marshall 
1999; Wright 1991). A broader definition or a ‘way of thinking’ about justice is 
attractive because it can create a wide umbrella for restorative practices with ‘a 
common core of values and ethics’ (Shapland 2014: 124). However, it is also 
important to define it in concrete terms to avoid imprecision and overuse of the term 
(McCold 2000; Daly 2016).  
 
This approach is taken in the widely-used definition by the Home Office researcher 
Tony Marshall: 
 
Restorative justice is a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a 
particular offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the 
aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future. (Marshall 1999: 5). 
 
While this definition has been subject to contestation and critique (Dignan 2005), it 
appears in countless texts on restorative justice. It emphasizes restorative justice as a 
process, but also hints at specific outcomes that are to be achieved, namely something 
that ‘deals with the aftermath’ and ‘implications for the future.  These relatively 
vague outcomes point to a second source of contention around defining restorative 
justice, whether it should be seen as a process or an outcome (or both).   A process-
based definition stresses dialogue and cooperation. While most definitions include 
some description of a process, many also incorporate an emphasis on future 
outcomes. This can include a focus on ‘repairing the harm’ through apology, 
forgiveness, repayment or some other symbolic or material reparation (Retzinger and 
Scheff 1996). 
 
A danger of including outcomes in a definition of restorative justice is that there are 
no clear reasons why certain outcomes will be reached in all cases, particularly when 
the process is dominated by the unique needs and desires of different people in 
specific contexts. There is a danger that a focus on outcomes will come to dominate 
(Shapland 2014), and lead to a one-size-fits-all model.  For instance, offenders could 
be compelled to apologise, or victims to forgive, presenting a danger to the integrity 
of the practice.   
 
Recently, Daly has suggested that restorative justice is best defined as a justice 
mechanism (2016): 
 
Restorative justice is a contemporary justice mechanism to address crime, 
disputes, and bounded community conflict. The mechanism is a meeting (or 
several meetings) of affected individuals, facilitated by one or more impartial 
people. Meetings can take place at all phases of the criminal process, pre-
arrest, diversion from court, pre-sentence, and post-sentence, as well as for 
offending or conflicts not reported to the police. Specific practices will vary, 
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depending on context, but are guided by rules and procedures that align with 
what is appropriate in the context of the crime, dispute, or bounded conflict (p. 
14).2 
 
This definition locates restorative justice as a specific set of practices.  Certain values 
underpin the practice and desired outcomes might be encouraged, but they will be 
dependent on different contexts.  
 
Elsewhere I have identified the core elements of the restorative justice mechanism: 
lay encounters, expressive narratives, and ritual dynamics (Rossner 2017). I will 
briefly revisit them here, as they become important both when developing a theory of 
restorative justice and making sense of the empirical research on victims.  
 
Restorative justice is unique in that the process relies on the active participation of lay 
people - victims, offenders, families, friends and community members - in some kind 
of (usually face-to-face) dialogue.  It is a process that runs counter to increasingly 
professionalized and bureaucratised criminal justice (Garland 2001).3 The 
predominant forms of restorative justice that involve victims are victim-offender 
mediation, conferencing, and circles. 
 
In victim-offender mediation, the dominant model across most of continental Europe 
and parts of North America, the encounter takes the form of a dyadic exchange, 
mediated by a neutral third party.  The parties meet to discuss the events leading up to 
the offence, the offence itself, and the impact that it has had on both the victim and 
offender.  The parties might then come to some sort of resolution, usually involving 
reparation of some sort.   Clearly, the integrity of this practice is compromised when 
victims do not take part.  
 
Conferencing, also known as family group conferencing or restorative justice 
conferencing, developed first in New Zealand and then in Australia, and then spread 
across much of the common-law world (Johnston 2013).   It involves meetings 
between victims, offenders, and direct stakeholders such as family, friends, and 
community members.  Participants discuss the offence, how everyone was harmed, 
and then agree to ways to ‘repair the harm.’  Even if a victim is unwilling or unable to 
attend, a conference can still take place with friends, family, community members, 
and at times victim representatives.  
 
Circles, or sentencing circles, are generally found in indigenous communities across 
North America.  They involve an encounter between several different stakeholders, 
including victims, offenders, community members, judges and other criminal justice 
officials (Johnstone 2013).  A key difference from other restorative justice processes 
is that circles can replace sentencing in a formal justice system.  Respected 
community members play a large role here, working with offenders and to a lesser 
extent victims, to develop appropriate sentences.   
 
A second key element of restorative justice mechanism is the development of a 
narrative that focuses on the emotions of lay participants (Sherman 2003).  Here, 
victims (and in conferencing models, supporters and community members) are invited 
to articulate a narrative about how they have been harmed by an offence.  Offenders 
are invited contribute to a narrative that acknowledges any harm, accepts 
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responsibility, and expresses remorse (Rossner et al. 2013).  In these narratives, a 
range of emotions can be expressed, including anger, fear, anxiety, shame, guilt, 
remorse, and hope.  
 
There are important differences between restorative justice encounters and other 
forms of victim narrative.  The one most often discussed is the use of Victim Personal 
Statements at the sentencing stage of the criminal process.  While victims are 
increasingly invited into court to speak (or to have a statement read out), this is rather 
different from a narrative that is co-produced in collaboration with offenders and 
other stakeholders.  Ethnographic work on the emotional dynamics of victim impact 
statement suggest that they may prove to be unsatisfactory encounters (Rock 2010) 
where victims are incompletely ‘cooled out’ in a way that does little to diffuse their 
anger (Booth 2013).  
 
A final feature of the restorative justice mechanism is that it takes on ritual dynamics.  
Justice processes have long been seen through a ritual lens, with a focus on the 
staging, symbolism, and meaning that is instilled through the practice (Durkheim 
1995, Maruna 2011).  Rituals are an important part of social life because they help 
one to make sense of a society’s collective values, morals, and symbols, and give 
structure, order and dignity to otherwise shapeless social events (Collins 2004).  They 
can also produce ‘collective effervescence’ -  fellow-feeling or group solidarity. Many 
has suggested that restorative justice is a unique form of ritual that runs counter to the 
stigmatising dynamics of other criminal justice interventions (Braithwaite and 
Mugford 1994; Dignan et al. 2007; Rossner, 2013; Zehr 1990).  The preparation and 
the staging of restorative justice encounters is aimed at developing a ritual where 
participants’ express emotion, develop solidarity, and produce meaningful symbols 
(Rossner, 2013).    
 
It is easy to see how the elements of the restorative justice mechanism are particularly 
suited to meeting many victims’ needs.  It provides a space where they can be treated 
with respect and legitimacy, articulate their emotions, participate in decision making, 
and perhaps become attuned to the experience and emotions of the other. 
Standards for restorative justice: values and desired outcomes 
 
I have suggested above that restorative justice can be defined as a justice mechanism 
that contains elements of lay participation, expressive narratives, and ritual dynamics.  
However, best practice will seek to uphold certain values and achieve certain 
desirable outcomes (Johnstone 2013, Van Ness 2003).  John Braithwaite has provided 
the most comprehensive set of standards for restorative justice that encompasses both 
values and outcomes (2002).  
 
First, Braithwaite identifies constraining standards, including empowerment, non-
domination, respectful listening, equal concern for all stakeholders, and 
accountability. These standards form the basis of any restorative practice and must be 
honoured and enforced as ‘fundamental procedural safeguards’ (Braithwaite 2003: 8). 
For instance, if a dialogue develops that included dominating behaviour or 
disrespectful language the encounter should not be allowed to continue.  These 
standards allow participation in a way that promotes safety and empowerment.     
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The second category consists of maximizing standards, including restoration of: 
damaged relationships, human dignity, property loss, safety, freedom, compassion or 
caring, peace, a sense of duty as a citizen, emotional restoration, provision of support, 
and the prevention of future injustice, often interpreted as the reduction of offending. 
These outcomes are consistent with what victims say they want out of such a practice 
(Strang 2002). These standards are to be encouraged, but not required.    
 
The final category consists of emergent standards, including remorse, apology, 
censure of the act, mercy, and forgiveness.  These, too, are desired outcomes of 
restorative justice, but they differ from maximizing standards in that they can only 
arise organically.  For instance, while a facilitator might encourage victim and 
offender to identify ways to restore their relationship or a victim’s sense of safety, it 
would be wrong to encourage a victim to forgive or an offender to show remorse.  
Doing so would violate the constraining standards of non-domination and 
empowerment.  
Restoring what?  
 
While the above set of standards provides a useful way to think about values and 
outcomes, many of these concepts are still somewhat unclear. In particular, there is no 
agreed-upon definition of what ‘restoration’ means in restorative justice.  It has been 
noted by Daly and Proietti-Scifoni (2011) that there is a plethora of ‘re’ words in 
restorative justice that have been used inconsistently in the literature: restoration, 
reparation, reconciliation, reintegration, and so on.  The etymologic root of these 
words suggests a backwards-looking quality.  This is a conceptual challenge to 
restorative justice, as it often positions itself as a forward-looking process. 
 
So, what might restoration mean in the context of a victim-offender encounter? 
Bottoms (2003) suggests that it can be understood as ‘community restoration,’ 
defined as ‘a restoration of prior social relationships in a community, with an 
understood structural and normative framework’ (p. 93).  Bottoms (drawing on 
Tavuchis, 1991) suggests that the generative social mechanism though which relations 
are restored is through apology. This will be explored in the next section. 
 
Community restoration assumes that victim and offender come from the same 
‘understood structural and normative framework.’  This means that they come from 
the same moral community and have shared values.  What’s to be restored when we 
can’t assume a shared normative framework, an increasingly likely scenario in 
modern urban environments?  First, although victims and offenders are increasingly 
strangers to each other, it can’t be assumed that they come from different moral 
communities. But sometimes they do.  Here the concept of ‘micro-community’ 
(McCold 2004) may be helpful.  While victim and offender may not belong to the 
same ‘community,’ they both have their own ‘micro-communities’ of supporters, 
family, and friends.  Restorative justice might be able to restore the offender to their 
micro-community and the victim to their prior social relations.  This is more likely to 
happen under the conferencing model.  
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Making sense of restorative justice: theoretical perspectives 
 
Theoretical perspectives on restorative justice have been criticized for focusing 
primarily on reducing re-offending at the expense of victims’ needs.4 While it is true 
that the dominant theoretical traditions in restorative justice often say more about 
offenders than victims, it is perhaps unfair to say that these traditions have neglected 
victims.  They are, after all, criminological theories that aim to explain the causes of 
offending and how to address it. 
 
A broader set of theories from sociology, psychology, and philosophy may be used to 
understand how restorative justice might be beneficial (or harmful) for victims of 
crime. This includes procedural justice theories and interaction ritual theories.  More 
specifically, recent work on the nature of apology and forgiveness can help us to 
further understand victims and restorative justice.  
Procedural Justice Theory 
 
Procedural justice theory asserts that citizens will trust and find legitimacy in the legal 
system if they feel that they are treated fairly and with respect (Tyler 2006, Tyler and 
Huo 2002). Perceptions of fairness derive from how people feel about the process, but 
not the outcomes, of a legal intervention.  For instance, citizens assess the legitimacy 
of the police based on how they are treated, irrespective of any outcomes that might 
arise from their interaction (Tyler and Huo 2002).  Procedural justice maps on to 
victims’ needs to be treated with respect and fairness, to feel that they can express 
themselves, and that they have some control over the process.      
 
A particularly important facet of procedural justice is that standing, or an 
acknowledgement of one’s status within a group, is key to one’s sense that they have 
been treated fairly (Strang 2002).   Standing indicated that one is to be treated with 
dignity and respect.  The theory, then, is that restorative justice builds legitimacy 
because victims are given standing.  The core elements of restorative justice - lay 
participation, expressive narrative and ritual dynamics - all contribute to a sense of 
fairness and democratic participation, especially compared to court which can be 
impersonal and hierarchical.  
Interaction Ritual Theory 
 
As explored above, the ritual dynamics of restorative justice encounters are a key 
element of the process.  Collins (2004) has developed the theory of interaction ritual 
chains, which provides a powerful argument for the micro-level, ritual foundation of 
our moral order. In this context, an interaction ritual is a social encounter with the 
following distinct features: (1) people are physically together in a room and aware of 
each other’s bodily presence; (2) there are delineated boundaries between who is 
participating in the interaction and who is an outsider; (3) participants have a shared 
focus of attention and a (4) shared mood.  Each of these elements feed into each other 
to create a certain rhythmic coordination and synchronization in participants’ 
conversation, bodily movements, and emotions. When people become ‘caught up in 
the rhythm and mood of the talk’ (Collins 2004: 48), a sense of collective 
effervescence emerges along with feelings of social solidarity and shared emotion.  If 
this sense of shared emotion can be achieved, it can result in longer term impacts on 
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one’s emotional energy, include feelings of confidence, elation, initiative, and a 
recommitment to the group’s standards of morality. 
 
Collins’ theory lends itself well to understanding the process of restorative justice. 
Restorative justice encounters are likely to be successful interaction rituals because 
they are likely to feature high intensity of emotions, and are structured to include all 
the ingredients the theory posits (see Braithwaite and Mugford 1994; Rossner 2011).  
Victims and offenders come together, often sitting in a circle, to share their narratives. 
Facilitators guide the discussion from expressions of fear, anxiety, and anger to 
expressions of reconciliation and solidarity.  When successful, this can be observed 
through the articulation of apology and forgiveness, and symbolic integration through 
handshakes, eye contact, and hugs (Rossner 2011, 2013). In theory, the micro-level 
production of solidarity and shared emotion provides restorative justice with the 
unique power to achieve its standards and goals. On the other hand, they can also fail 
to achieve these outcomes, leaving participants flat, deflated, or angry.  
 
Apology and Forgiveness 
 
Procedural justice and interaction ritual theories focus on the entirety of the 
restorative justice encounter.  They are both concerned with emotional states, such as 
fairness,5 solidarity and emotional energy.  A final set of theories focus on a 
particularly valued exchange in restorative justice: apology and forgiveness.  
 
It has long been noted that the exchange of apology and forgiveness is a unique part 
of restorative justice.  Retzinger and Scheff have referred to this as the ‘core 
sequence’ of symbolic reparation, and suggested that it is ‘the vital element that 
differentiates conferences from all other forms of crime control.’ (1996: 317).   The 
core sequence involves an expression of genuine remorse by the offender followed by 
some sign or gesture of forgiveness by the victim.  
 
In Tavuchis’ classic work on the sociology of apology (1991), he astutely notes that 
apology is a ‘delicate and precarious transaction’ (p. vii) but it also seems to work a 
kind of magic (see also Goffman 1971).  As Tavuchis explains, ‘[n]o matter how 
sincere or effective, [an apology] does not and cannot undo what has been done. And 
yet, in a mysterious way and according to its own logic, this is precisely what it 
manages to do’ (p. 5).  Can an apology actually provide restoration?  Both Tavuchis 
and Bottoms (2003) suggest that it can, at least in situations where the victim and 
offender share the same ‘understood structural and normative framework’ (Bottoms 
2003, p. 93).   The so-called magic of apology is that it is a social mechanism that can 
help to transcend breaches of this shared normative order.  According to Bottoms, 
‘The key to its success lies squarely in the normative and relational realms’ (2003, p. 
97). 
 
The second half of the core sequence is forgiveness.  There is a significant amount of 
research promoting the benefits of forgiveness.6  Lacey and Pickard (2015) draw on 
both clinical and evolutionary psychology to demonstrate that forgiveness is both 
normatively preferable and empirically superior to anger and blame for both offenders 
and victims.7  They argue that anger and blame are poor ways to engender 
responsibility because of their propensity to make people feel ‘rejected, worthless, 
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ashamed, and uncared for…damaging any sense of hope for the future’ (p. 671).  
Approaching an offense with an attitude of forgiveness and respect allows both 
offender and victim to look towards a better future.  Nussbaum (2016) provides a 
similar critique of anger, demonstrating ways that it is a both a morally wrong and 
psychologically maladaptive emotion for victims.   
 
Lacey and Pickard also use evidence from evolutionary psychology to argue that that 
forgiveness serves a positive function for the forgiver. Both forgiveness and 
vengeance have been shown to be universal human strategies to respond to 
exploitation and prevent its reoccurrence. Vengeance, however, carries much heavier 
risks: creating a cycle of vengeance and further rupturing relationships to a point 
beyond repair.  Forgiveness, on the other hand, motivates reparative behaviour and 
de-escalation.  It thereby ‘functions to protect against the risk for future exploitation 
by preserving the possibility of an ongoing mutually beneficial relations and re-
establishing or indeed increasing the perceived value of that relationship to the 
exploiter’ (p. 681).  We can see this at work in restorative justice, with a consistent 
finding that victims who meet with their offenders are much less likely to feel 
vengeance or want to seek revenge This will be explored more in depth in the next 
section.  
    
 Braithwaite (2016) also argues that forgiveness is the key to a positive future.  He 
makes two important points.   The first is that forgiveness exists along a continuum, 
and will rarely take the form of a dramatic demonstration.  More common in 
restorative justice is an encounter where people reach a practical agreement about on 
how to ‘offer some repair for the harm and close the matter’ (p. 79).  Drawing on the 
work of Tim Chapman, a restorative justice scholar and practitioner in Northern 
Ireland, Braithwaite argues that while these encounters fall short of explicit 
forgiveness, they are a success in that victims can say ‘that’s good enough for me.’  
He notes, ‘quite often victims hope never to see the offender again, but if they did 
meet them on the street at least it could be civil.  Thin rather than thick civility.’ (p. 
80).  The second point that Braithwaite makes is that such ‘thin civility’ is part of the 
civilising impact of restorative justice. It is a historically emergent property of a 
society and culture that promotes it.  Even with its deep theological roots, forgiveness 
is not a valued component of contemporary western culture (Nussbaum 2016).  
However, promoting forgiveness through restorative justice is part of the long-term 
commitment to a more civilized justice system.8  
 
Bringing together these ideas about apology and forgiveness, we can draw certain 
inferences about how they might function for victims in restorative justice. Let us first 
consider what it means for an apology to ‘restore’ victims.  There seem to be two 
ingredients needed for this to happen.  First, there needs to be a shared normative 
framework to restore (Bottoms 2003).  Second, the apology must be an expression of 
genuine remorse (Retzinger and Scheff 1996).  When these criteria are met, apology 
can act as a generative mechanism to restore victims to their prior social relations. 
 
Forgiveness on the other hand seems to go one step beyond restoration.  The work of 
Lacey and Pickard, Braithwaite, and Nussbaum all share a similar thread- that 
forgiveness is the mechanism by which we move forward beyond a conflict.  As Lacy 
and Pickard note: ‘Forgiveness is both genuinely forward-looking and genuinely 
conciliatory’ (p. 681) In this sense, restoration, with its backward-looking 
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connotation, is a misleading word.  While apologies might restore, forgiveness can 
transform. Furthermore, there is no need for a shared normative framework for 
forgiveness to bring positive benefits for victims.  Forgiveness, both the thick and thin 
variety, can be a universal mechanism for transformation independent of any prior 
social relations.      
 
The ‘magic’ of apology and the transformative nature of forgiveness both hinge on 
them being elements of successful interaction rituals. The ritual dynamic of a 
restorative conference can set the stage for genuine expressions of remorse to emerge.  
An apology is likely to come only after a build-up of shared focus and emotional 
intensity between victim and offender as they express their emotions and tell their 
stories.  Indeed, the exchange of apology and forgiveness is often a ‘turning point’ in 
restorative justice whereby victim and offender can start to engage in cohesive and 
high-solidarity behaviour (Rossner 2013).   
Empirical research on victims and restorative justice 
 
Restorative justice processes have been subject to a large amount of empirical enquiry 
(Dignan 2005, Hoyle 2012).  In this section I will review some of the most robust and 
well-replicated research on procedural aspects and restorative outcomes for victims, 
focusing on the role of apology and forgiveness.  I mainly draw on two large and 
interconnected research projects that compare victims (and offenders) who were 
randomly assigned to participate in restorative justice to those whose cases were 
processed in the courts.  The first of these projects is known as RISE and focuses on 
cases randomly assigned to either prosecution or a restorative justice conference for 
personal property and personal violence in Canberra, Australia.9  This project was 
carried out by the Justice Research Consortium (JRG) and led by Lawrence Sherman 
and Heather Strang.  Most of the findings are summarizing in Strang (2002) and 
several other publications with colleagues (Barnes et al. 2015, Sherman et al. 2005, 
Sherman et al. 2015, Strang et al. 2006, Strang et al. 2013). 
 
The second project consists of a further set of experiments of restorative justice 
conferencing, carried out by the JRG in the UK: London, Northumbria and Thames 
Valley.  These experiments, along with two other non-experimental studies of victim-
offender mediation in South Yorkshire and London, were funded by the Home Office 
and evaluated by a team led by Joanna Shapland (see Shapland et al. 2006, 2007, 
2011). The JRG experiments compared cases randomly assigned to court with cases 
assigned to court plus restorative justice for violent and property offences with adult 
offenders at the pre-sentence stage in London, post-sentence in Thames Valley, and 
both pre-sentence and as a diversion from prosecution in Northumbria.  Data from 
these experiments have also been analyzed by Sherman and Strang and colleagues 
(Angel et al. 2014, Sherman et al. 2005, Strang et al. 2006, Strang et al. 2013, 
Sherman et al. 2015) and in my own work on the ritual dynamics of restorative justice 
conferences (Rossner 2013).  While I will focus on the results from these two 
projects, I will supplement this with other research from New Zealand, Australia, the 
UK, and the US.     
Procedural justice for victims  
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A key element of procedural justice is for people to feel that they are given standing: 
their experiences and views should be listened to and respected.  This maps on to the 
expressive needs of victims discussed earlier in the chapter (Bottoms and Roberts, 
2010).  A desire to meet these needs seems to be a key reason why victims agree to 
take part in restorative justice (Shapland et al. 2011).  Most victims reported, both 
before and after their conference, that it was important or very important for them to 
be able to ‘express [their] feelings and speak directly to the other person’ (2011, p. 
91).  Other important reasons were the desire to help the other person, a desire to have 
a say in how the problem was resolved, and a desire to have questions answered about 
the offender.  A desire for material reparation or compensation was only occasionally 
important to victims, though still present.  This suggests that victims are looking 
primarily for a procedurally fair process where their expressive, service and decision 
making needs can be met.     
 
When it comes to procedural justice, there is a consistent body of work suggesting 
that victims (and offenders) perceive restorative justice as fairer, more satisfying, 
more respectful, and more legitimate than what is offered in the courtroom (Barnes et 
al. 2015, Strang 2002, Shapland et al. 2007, Tyler et al. 2007.  See also Daly 2004, 
Morris and Maxwell 1998 and Umbreit et al. 1994).  Vicitims report that they are able 
to express themselves in restorative justice, and this is confirmed by observational 
research: Shapland et al. (2011) measured the amount of time victims spend speaking 
and found that victims and offenders contributed equally.  Finally, victims who 
participate in restorative justice are also more likely to rate the entire criminal justice 
system as more fair compared to victims whose cases are processed at court alone 
(Shapland et al. 2011). 
Symbolic reparation: Apology and forgiveness 
 
Most victims indicated that they would like an apology (over 90 per cent in Australia, 
Strang 2002).  86 per cent of Australian victims and 96 per cent of British victims 
who participated in a restorative justice conference received one, compared to 19 per 
cent and 7 per cent respectively of victims who went to court (Strang et al. 2013). In a 
sense, this is not surprising, as the structure of the courtroom interaction makes 
apologies less likely, and when they happen, less convicting.  As Shapland et al. 
(2011) note, ‘Having the victim present, particularly in a face-to-face meeting in 
which everyone speaks, seems definitely to be a major element in the offender 
working through embarrassment and nervousness…to remorse, expressed in apology’ 
(p. 130).  This lends support to the interaction ritual thesis, that an apology is a 
symbol that comes after the development of emotional entrainment and mutual focus 
of attention.  
 
The story is less clear, however, when it comes to forgiveness.  Most offender in the 
British JRG study indicated that they accepted the apology that was offered to them 
(91 per cent, Shapland et al. 2007).  However, when asked if they thought that the 
apologies that the received were genuine, 45 per cent said that the offender was 
sincere and 21 per cent said they were not. A similar result is found in the RISE data, 
77 per cent of victims indicated the apology was sincere and 23 per cent did not 
(Strang 2002).  Hayes (2006) reanalyzed the empirical data from RISE and Daly 
(2003) and found in both studies that the core sequence of apology and forgiveness 
was achieved in less than half of the time. Thus, while there is ample evidence that 
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conferences are pereived to be fairer than court and people are satisfied with the 
process, there is less evidence that conferences are actually restorative (Daly 2006). 
Clearly, more in-depth research is needed on this complex dynamic.      
 
Shapland (2016) has noted that in the JRG sample very few offenders explicitly 
articulated forgiveness.  Instead, they were more likely to use more implicit 
externalisations, such as acknowledging the offender’s remorse, nodding at them, 
shaking their hand, or even at times offering a hug.  This echoes Braithwaite’s 
reminder that forgiveness exists along a continuum, and the ‘good enough’ type of 
thin civility is an important part of what restorative justice can achive. 
 
In my research on ritual and restorative justice, I examine in-depth the dynamics of a 
sample of conferences from the London experiments (Rossner 2013).  Conferences 
that were a ritual success, in terms of expressions of solidarity, shared emotion, 
smiling, touching, and hugging were also conference where apologies were offered 
and were accepted, either explicitly or implictly.  The exchange of apology and 
forgiveness seem to act as a symbol of the (perhaps momentary) sense of shared 
emotion.  I also reanalyzed the RISE data and found that the ritual ingredients and 
procedural justice elements, such as the development of a rhythm and balance to the 
interaction and respectful and non-dominating treatment were positively related to 
later expressions of remorse, apology, and forgiveness (Rossner 2013).  The dynamics 




There is strong evidence that victims who meet their offender are less likely to desire 
physical revenge (Sherman and Strang 2011).  Strikingly, in the RISE data, 45 per 
cent of victims of violence crime whose cases were assigned to court said they would 
harm their offenders if they had the chance.  Only 9 per cent of the victims assigned 
to the restorative justice conference reported this desire (Sherman et al. 2005). 
 
In the UK experiments, there was also a marked difference in terms of the prevalence 
of desire for revenge: 14 per cent of court victims compared to 3 per cent of 
restorative justice victims (Sherman et al. 2005) These findings strongly suggest that 
RJC can succeed in assuaging the feelings of vengeance felt by many victims of 
violent crime towards their assailants.  
The future of restorative justice practice and policy 
 
To briefly summarise the preceding sections: restorative justice might usefully be 
defined as a practice that is marked by lay participation, the chance for an expressive 
narrative to develop, and certain ritual dynamics. Constraining standards underpin the 
practice, and maximising and emergent standards provide a set of desirable outcomes 
that can be used to evaluate its success.  The most critical of these outcomes for 
victims is a sense of ‘restoration.’  Though this is an unclear concept, it is best 
understood in relational terms between people who share a moral community.  It is 
also likely related to apology, and perhaps forgiveness.  Theoretical perspectives 
consider the procedural justice of the encounter and frame restorative justice as a kind 
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of interaction ritual that can produce feelings of solidarity and shared emotion 
between group members.  Most notably, the ritual dynamics of apology and 
forgiveness seem to be key to understanding how the process can help victims.  There 
is a large and consistent body of work suggesting that victims see restorative justice 
as fairer and more respectful than traditional justice approaches. Most victims also 
receive an apology, and those who do are likely to accept or acknowledge that 
apology.  A smaller number articulate forgiveness, though it is unknown how many 
victims respond to an apology with a subtler, ‘thin’ forgiveness. 
 
The challenge for restorative justice is to create successful interaction rituals marked 
by this core sequence between victims and offenders who do not share the same moral 
community, a likely scenario in most contemporary urban environments.  Restorative 
justice scholars and advocates have so far produced unsatisfactory accounts of how 
this will be achieved (Bottoms 2003, Daly 2002).   I offer two possible solutions.  The 
first is that we not worry about restoring the relationship between victims and 
offenders, but rather focus on how remorse, apology, and forgiveness can restore 
people to their already existing micro-communities (Rossner and Bruce 2016).  
Clearly, a conferencing model where the circle is widened to include family and 
friends is more likely to achieve this than a victim-offender mediation.  This is 
consistent with most of the research reviewed above, which focuses on the 
conferencing model.   
 
Second, we can take seriously the idea that ‘thin civility’ or the ‘good enough for me’ 
variety of forgiveness may be enough to allow the victim and offender to move on 
(Braithwaite 2016).  These types of events should also be considered a victory for 
restorative justice, not only the dramatic (but rare) core sequence of apology and 
forgiveness.  Seen this way, the forward-looking concept of transformation, or 
‘moving on,’ might be more useful than restoration when it comes to victims and 
offenders who are not part of the same community. The next step for scholars is to 
rethink how we might measure such ‘thin civility’ and ‘moving on’ as an outcome of 
successful restorative justice.   
 
Implicit in all this this, though not discussed much in this chapter, is that it is very 
hard to pull of such complex and nuanced rituals.  Research on restorative justice 
facilitation suggests that it is labour-intensive work and the best practitioners have a 
significant amount of training and experience. It may seem like ‘magic’ but in fact it 
is very hard work to prepare, conduct, and manage such encounters.10 When victims 
are not well-prepared or the conference is organised in a way where they feel they are 
not listened to, they are likely to report that the conference makes them feel worse 
(Choi et al. 2013).    
 
How can the above challenges be addressed by the 2014 Action Plan that envisions a 
‘victim-centred’ restorative justice across England and Wales?  In 2016 the House of 
Commons Justice Committee held an inquiry into restorative justice (House of 
Commons, 2016).  In it, they sought to assess whether the government was meeting 
the vision set out in the Action Plan.  The make several recommendations, the ones 
most relevant here include: (1) New procedures should be put in place to ensure that 
police do a better job of informing victims about restorative justice (as they are 
required to do under the Victims Code). The government should do away with the 
distinction made between victims of young offenders (who have a right to restorative 
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justice) and adult offenders (who have a right to learn about restorative justice). They 
also raise the possibility of a legislated right of victims to restorative justice, though 
believe that it is too soon to introduce such legislation.  (2) Consistent standards 
should be adopted in order to ensure a high quality of delivery, similar to the recently 
developed Restorative Services Quality Mark.11 (3) The development of clear 
guidance on what constitutes a successful restorative justice scheme, including 
measurement relating to offenders and victims such as victim satisfaction.12  
 
In some ways, these recommendations are a positive step forward.  Increasing 
information and access is a good thing for victims (though how different agencies can 
cope with increased demand is unclear, see Wright 2015). Most notably, points two 
and three acknowledge that a national strategy of restorative justice will only be 
successful if high quality restorative justice is delivered across the board.  On the 
other hand, a clear and co-ordinated strategy for how to raise awareness of restorative 
justice, increase victim participation without being overly burdensome or coercive, 
bringing about genuine remorse and meaningful apology, and achieving either ‘thick’ 
or ‘thin’ forgiveness is lacking in the current vision. 
  
Drawing on insights from theory and research discussed above, steps forward might 
include: (1) developing standards and measures of success that are informed by 
Braithwaite (2002), procedural justice theory, and interaction ritual theory;  (2) 
Ensuring enough resources are allocated for the significant preparation needed 
conduct high quality conferences that include the core-sequence; (3)  including 
apology, varieties of forgiveness, or other forward-looking outcomes in addition to 
measures of victim satisfaction when evaluating success.  This will contribute to a 
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2 This definition excludes practices that are sometimes included under the restorative justice 
umbrella, such as indigenous courts, problem solving courts, and truth commissions.  It also 
presents a challenge to contemporary practices that might have been termed ‘partly 
restorative’ by McCold and Watchtel (2003), such as some forms of restorative cautioning 
and community justice panels.  See Paterson and Clamp (2012) for more on this. Strang et al. 
(2013) similarly excludes these types of practices in their systematic review of restorative 
justice, as very few of them have undergone rigorous evaluations. 
3 Although, it is important to note that professionals have, and will continue to have, and 
important role to play in restorative justice, both in terms of training facilitators, and 
supporting its integration into criminal justice systems. See Dzur (2008) and Rossner and 
Bruce (2016).  
4 The dominant theoretical model of restorative justice focuses on how shame can work to 
reintegrate offenders (Braithwaite 1989).  This theory and the larger family of shame theories 
have developed sophisticated set of ideas about emotions, social bonds, and reintegration. It is 
true that victims often experience shame and it is worth thinking about how shame might help 
or hurt victims in restorative justice. Space limits a longer discussion of this here.   
5 Contrary to earlier thinking, fairness does seem to be rooted in the part of the brain that does 
emotional processing, See Hsu et al. 2008.   
6 Not least the centuries of Judeo-Christian and Islamic writings on the topic.  For more on the 
religious roots of forgiveness, see Nussbaum 2016, Fiddes 2016, and Braithwaite 2016. 
7 Lacey and Pickard’s argument is for an ambitious criminal justice reform that centres on 
forgiveness instead of what they call ‘affective blame.’  However, their model can apply at 
the micro level when making sense of how forgiveness might work in restorative justice.    
8 Martha Nussbaum (2016) disagrees with accounts that forgiveness is to be promoted.   Like 
others, she points out the flaw with anger: It seems to be inseparable from desire for payback 
(or revenge), pointing out that it is a kind of ‘magical thinking’ to think that expression of 
anger will somehow rebalance the scales. She also critiques this kind of ‘transactional 
forgiveness’ that seems to make up the ‘core sequence’ of symbolic reparation in restorative 
justice: ‘In short, forgiveness of the transactional sort, far from being the antidote to anger, 
looks like a continuation of anger’s payback wish by another name’ (p11).  Instead she argues 
for an alternative to transactional forgiveness, where ‘generosity, love, and even humor 
replace the grim drama of penance and exacted contrition’ (p22). Her critique of transactional 
forgiveness seems to hinge on the idea that apology in this type of situation can feel coerced. I 
would argue that she is too quick to dismiss institutionalized forgiveness and this type of 
‘exacted contrition’ is quite different from the ‘core sequence’ described by Retzinger and 
Scheff, where remorse is genuinely felt after an in-depth discussion of harm and pain, 
articulated meaningfully, and resulting in forgiveness.  To do otherwise would be to violate 
Braithwaite’s constraining standards.  To be sure, this sequence is rare (as Retzinger and 
Scheff take pains to point out) but it is an ideal-type that we should be working towards, even 
if in practice it will rarely be achieve, partly because we find it hard to break out of this anger-
payback-transactional paradigm. It rarely happens, but the ‘good enough’ variety of thin 
civility espoused by Braithwaite is already a step forward to a more just world.  
9 RISE stands for Reintegrative Shaming Experiments, and was heavily influenced by 
Braithwaite’s (1989) theory.  While a large part of the experiment focuses on how restorative 
justice can reduce reoffending, data was also collected on victims’ experiences. However, due 
to the focus on offending in the original design of the experiment, cases were randomly 
assigned by offender.  Technically, then, from a victims’ perspective this is more accurately 
described a ‘quasi-experimental comparison of victims whose offenders were randomly 
assigned to either court of conference’ (Strang 2002, p. 74). The RISE research also evaluated 
restorative justice for crimes not involving a direct victim, such as drink-driving and 
corporate shoplifting, but are not discussed here.    
10 See Doak and O’Mahony (2004), Miller (2011), and Rossner (2013) for examples from 
Northern Ireland, the U.S, and England, respectively, detailing how much effort goes into 
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preparing victims and offenders, staging the actual conference, and the follow-up involved. In 
an evaluation of a pre-sentence restorative justice programme for adult offenders in New 
South Wales, Australia, we calculated that it took about eighteen hours to prepare for a 
conference plus nearly three hours to conduct one (Rossner et al. 2013).  This includes 
identifying stakeholders and support people, meeting in person with all participants and 
potential participants to prepare them, finding a suitable venue and ensuring it is set up 
appropriately.   
11 The quality mark has been developed by the Restorative Justice Council, an independent 
membership body advocating for restorative practice across the UK.  It required compliance 
with a comprehensive and rigorous set of standards. See 
http://www.restorativejustice.org.uk/restorative-service-quality-mark.    
12 Other important recommendations concern data-sharing, restorative justice for intimate-
partner violence, how funding is allocated to Police and Crime Commissioners, expanding the 
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